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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
onsider two recent controversies.  
             In September of 2011, the University of Medicine and Dentistry of 
New Jersey announced that all nurses employed in the hospital it runs would 
have to help with abortion patients before and after the procedure, “reversing a 
long-standing policy exempting employees who refuse based on religious or moral 
objections.”1  In October, a group of objecting nurses filed a federal lawsuit.  In 
November, U.S. District Judge Jose Linares granted a request for a temporary 
restraining order barring the hospital from requiring the objecting nurses to undergo 
any “training, procedures or performances relating to abortions...”2  In December, 
the hospital backed down, agreeing that nurses with conscientious objections would 
not have to assist with pre- or post-operative care for abortions except when the 
mother’s life is threatened and no other non-objecting staff are available to assist.  
The presiding judge made it clear that the parties would be back in court if they 
violated either the letter or spirit of the agreement.3 
On January 20, 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
announced a final rule specifying preventive health services that most new 
insurance plans would be required to cover under the Affordable Care Act.4  
Contraceptives and sterilizations were listed as required services, including drugs 
like Plan B and Ella but not RU-486.  HHS provided a narrow exemption from 
this rule for certain religious entities like churches, but this exemption did not 
exempt most religiously affiliated universities, hospitals and social service 
agencies.  HHS said religiously affiliated groups that do not already provide such 
coverage would have an additional year, until August 1, 2013, to comply with the 
new mandate.  In the meantime, HHS explained, these employers would have to 
disclose the fact that they do not offer such coverage and tell employees that 
affordable contraceptive services can be found at sites such as community health 
centers, public clinics, and hospitals.  
Cardinal Timothy Dolan, president of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, swiftly condemned this decision. “Never before has the federal 
government forced individuals and organizations to go out into the marketplace 
and buy a product that violates their conscience,” Dolan said. “This shouldn't 
                                                 
1 Rob Stein, “New Jersey Nurses Charge Religious Discrimination over Hospital Abortion Policy,” 
The Washington Post, November 27, 2011. 
2 Danquah v. University of Medicine and Dentistry, Temporary Restraining Order (November 3, 
2011) at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahTRO.pdf 
3 Danquah v. University of Medicine and Dentistry, Transcript of Proceedings (December 22, 2011) 
at  http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahSettlementTranscripts.pdf  Other court documents and 
briefs in this case may be found at http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/5176 
4 Department of Health and Human Services, “A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius” (January 20, 2012) at  
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html  
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happen in a land where free exercise of religion ranks first in the Bill of Rights."5  
John Garvey, president of the Catholic University of America, argued that the 
mandate “requires us to contradict in our actions the very lessons that we're 
teaching with our words in classes and in our daily activities at the university. It 
makes us hypocrites in front of the students that we're trying to educate.”6 
Following the announcement of the final rule, Catholic priests across the country 
read letters to their congregants protesting the mandate.7  Members of Congress 
filed bills, some of which are designed to broaden the exemption and others of 
which are aimed at undoing the mandate entirely.  Lawsuits that had been filed 
earlier against the administration gathered support,8 and the controversy became an 
issue in the 2012 presidential race, with certain Republican candidates charging that 
the final rule was evidence of a “war on religion” by the Obama administration.  
For their part, reproductive rights groups praised the decision by Secretary of 
Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius to refuse to provide a broader 
exemption, even as they noted their disagreement with the exemption for 
churches, claiming it lacked congressional authorization.9  The National 
Women’s Law Center (NWLC) described the final rule as “a major milestone in 
protecting women’s health. Contraception is critical preventive health care and its 
use among women of child-bearing age is nearly universal.”10 Planned 
Parenthood argued that “all women, regardless of their employer, should be able 
to access the birth control coverage benefit,” adding that it disagreed with the 
decision to delay the application of the rule to certain religiously affiliated 
organizations.11  
                                                 
5 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Bishops Vow to Fight Coercive HHS Mandate,” at 
http://usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/index.cfm 
6 PBS, “Obama Administration, Catholic Leaders Clash Over Contraception Mandate” (February 6, 
2012) at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/jan-june12/catholics_02-06.html 
7 Rick Jervis, “Catholics blast federal birth control mandate,” USA Today (January 30, 2012) at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2012-01-29/catholic-birth-control-protest/52874660/1 
8 On November 10, 2011, Belmont Abbey College sued the federal government to block the 
application of this rule to the college.  See Adelle M. Banks, Catholic College Sues Over 
Contraception Mandate, Religion News Service,  (November 11, 2011) at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/catholic-college-sues-over-contraception-
mandate/2011/11/11/gIQA7uasCN_story.html   
For a copy of the complaint, click here: http://www.becketfund.org/belmont-abbey-college-sues-the-
federal-government-over-new-obamacare-mandate/   
9 J. Lester Feder, “Contraceptive Rule a Pill for Obama,” Politico, December 7, 2011 at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70036.html 
10 National Women’s Law Center, “HHS Decision on Contraceptive Coverage a Major Milestone” 
(January 20, 2012) at http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/hhs-decision-contraceptive-coverage-
important-milestone 
11 Planned Parenthood Federation, “Planned Parenthood Applauds HHS for Ensuring Access to 
Affordable Birth Control” (January 20, 2012) at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-
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In its defense of the mandate, the White House said it would provide needed 
services to Americans no matter where they worked.12 The administration also 
pledged to work with religious groups during the additional year to address their 
concerns.13  “The Obama Administration is committed to both respecting religious 
beliefs and increasing access to important preventive services,” Domestic Policy 
Director Cecilia Muñoz said.14 
 
On February 10, 2012, however, President Barack Obama announced an 
“accommodation” of religious objections to the provision of certain health care 
services.  The president said religiously affiliated hospitals, universities, and 
social service agencies also would not be required to provide coverage for 
contraceptive services if they object for religious reasons, but such coverage 
would be extended to employees of objecting organizations nonetheless.  
President Obama explained: 
[R]eligious organizations won’t have to pay for [contraceptive services 
that are objectionable to them for religious reasons], and no religious 
institution will have to provide these services directly.  Let me repeat:  
These employers will not have to pay for, or provide, contraceptive 
services.  But women who work at these institutions will have access to 
free contraceptive services, just like other women, and they'll no longer 
have to pay hundreds of dollars a year that could go towards paying the 
rent or buying groceries.15  
More specifically, the Obama administration said that insurance companies will be 
required to cover contraception if the religious organization chooses not to do so.  
Thus, objecting religious organizations will not have to provide these benefits or 
refer employees to others to receive them.  Instead, the insurance companies of 
objecting religious employers will contact employees directly.  The insurer will 
offer these benefits to employees separately from the insurer’s agreement with the 
objecting religious employer.  The White House also said insurance companies will 
be required to provide these benefits free of charge.  According to the 
administration, “[c]overing contraception is cost neutral since it saves money by 
                                                                                                                                        
us/newsroom/press-releases/planned-parenthood-applauds-hhs-ensuring-access-affordable-birth-
control-38582.htm 
12 Cecila Muñoz, Health Reform, Preventive Services, and Religious Institutions (February 1, 2012) 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health-reform-preventive-services-and-religious-
institutions. 
13 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney (February 6, 2012) at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-
262012. 
14 Cecila Muñoz, Health Reform, Preventive Services, and Religious Institutions (February 1, 2012).  
15 Remarks by President Barack Obama on Preventive Care (February 10, 2012) at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/02/10/president-obama-speaks-
contraception-and-religious-institutions#transcript 
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keeping women healthy and preventing spending on other health services.”16   
Insurance companies will not be permitted to increase the premiums of objecting 
religious employers to cover the cost of contraceptive coverage, White House 
officials said.17 
An accompanying White House fact sheet said a final rule on the matter would be 
released on February 10, but it also said that document would describe an upcoming 
rulemaking that would memorialize President Obama’s accommodation. The 
administration published this document later on February 10.18  “These regulations 
finalize, without change, the interim final regulations” with the narrow exemption, 
the document states.  At the same time, it also provides: “Before the end of the 
temporary enforcement safe harbor, the Departments will work with stakeholders to 
develop alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing 
with respect to non-exempted, non-profit organizations with religious objections to 
such coverage.” In this document, the agencies also say they “intend to develop 
policies to achieve the same goals for self-insured group health plans sponsored by 
non-exempted, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to 
contraceptive coverage.”19  
A number of religious leaders, including some prominent Catholic leaders, 
welcomed this accommodation as a workable plan that helpfully addresses religious 
liberty concerns.20  For example, the Catholic Health Association said it was “very 
pleased with the White House announcement,”21 and that it “look[ed] forward to 
reviewing the specifics of the changes in the mandated benefits.”22 The Association 
                                                 
16 White House, “FACT SHEET: Women’s Preventive Services and Religious Institutions” 
(February 10, 2012) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-
preventive-services-and-religious-institutions 
17 Tracie Mauriello and Ann Rodgers, White House Revises on Insurance Mandate for 
Contraception Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (February 10, 2012) at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/12041/1209361-100.stm?cmpid=latest.xml#ixzz1mD6To9eb 
18 Departments of the Treasury, Labor and Health and Human Services, Final Rules on Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (February 10, 2012) at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-15/pdf/2012-3547.pdf 
19 Id. 
20 A co-author of this report also welcomed this accommodation and encouraged its careful 
implementation.  See Melissa Rogers, President Obama’s Contraceptive Solution, The Brookings 
Institution (February 10, 2012) at 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0210_obama_catholic_rogers.aspx ; and Melissa Rogers, 
Honoring Religious Objections and Access to Contraceptive Coverage, The Brookings Institution 
(February 17, 2012) at  http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0217_religion_obama_rogers.aspx    
21 Catholic Health Association is Very Pleased with Today’s White House Resolution that Protects 
Religious Liberty and Conscience Rights (February 10, 2012) at 
http://www.chausa.org/Pages/Newsroom/Releases/2012/Catholic_Health_Association_is_Very_Plea
sed_with_Todays_White_House_Resolution_that_Protects_Religious_Liberty_and_Conscience_Rig
hts/ 
22 Catholic Health Association Will Review the Proposed New Rules for the HHS Mandate (February 
13, 2012) at http://www.chausa.org/Pages/About_CHA/Presidents_Page/HHS_Mandate/ 
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of Jesuit Colleges & Universities “commend[ed] the Obama administration for its 
willingness to work with us on moving toward a solution,” and said it “look[ed] 
forward to working out the details of these new regulations with the White 
House.”23 An interfaith group of leaders hailed the accommodation as “a major 
victory for religious liberty and women’s health.”24  
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops initially called the plan “a first 
step in the right direction” that needed careful review, 25 but condemned it after 
engaging in that review. 26  Hundreds of academics and religious leaders also 
rejected the accommodation, deeming it “unacceptable.”27  These leaders argued 
that the policy would still require religious institutions and individuals to purchase 
insurance policies that would include objectionable services, and that the costs of 
contraceptive coverage would not be free but rather would be passed on to objecting 
religious institutions through higher premiums. The Catholic Conference also raised 
concerns about religious insurers that would object to providing coverage for 
contraceptive and sterilization services.  Further, the Conference argued that any 
employer with religious or moral reservations should be able to refuse to pay for 
and provide this coverage.  President Obama’s “proposal continues to involve 
needless government intrusion in the internal governance of religious institutions, 
and to threaten government coercion of religious people and groups to violate their 
most deeply held convictions,” the Conference said.  According to the Catholic 
Bishops, “[t]he only complete solution to this religious liberty problem is for HHS 
to rescind the mandate of these objectionable services.”28 Opponents of the 
accommodation also bitterly criticized the administration’s decision to issue a final 
rule with the narrow exemption while promising a future rulemaking to implement 
President Obama’s accommodation.29 
 
That these two controversies raise fundamental—and politically consequential—
questions is obvious.  But they take place against a backdrop of longstanding 
tensions between claims of conscience and laws of broad scope and application—
                                                 
23 Association of Jesuit Colleges & Universities Statement on Change to HHS Mandate for Religious 
Institutions (February 10, 2012) at http://www.ajcunet.edu/AJCU-Statement-on-HHS-Ruling.  
24 Prominent National Faith Leaders Celebrate White House’s Common-Ground Solution on 
Contraceptive Coverage (February 10, 2012) at 
http://www.faithinpubliclife.org/newsroom/press/consciencerelease/ 
25 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bishops Studying Initial White House Movement on 
Religious Liberty (February 10, 2012) at http://usccb.org/news/2012/12-025.cfm 
26 Bishops Renew Call to Legislative Action on Religious Liberty (February 10, 2012) at 
http://usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/bishops-renew-call-to-
legislative-action-on-religious-liberty.cfm   
27 Unacceptable (February 15, 2012) at http://www.becketfund.org/unacceptable-2/. 
28  Bishops Renew Call to Legislative Action on Religious Liberty (February 10, 2012) at 
http://usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/bishops-renew-call-to-
legislative-action-on-religious-liberty.cfm   
29 See, for example,  Six More Things Everyone Should Know About the HHS Mandate (February 13, 
2012) at http://usccbmedia.blogspot.com/2012/02/six-more-things-everyone-should-know.html 
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tensions well-known to experts but less so to public officials and most citizens.  
Knowing that the implementation of federal health care reform was bound to 
expose these tensions, the Brookings Project on Religion, Policy and Politics 
convened a day-long, off-the-record consultation in June 2011 (participants are 
quoted herein only by specific permission) involving theologians, moral 
philosophers, legal scholars, health practitioners, and advocates reflecting 
perspectives on all sides of these issues. This report is informed by that discussion 
as well as research the co-authors independently conducted.  It is not an attempt to 
reflect a group consensus on these issues.  The report sets forth the thoughts and 
conclusions of the authors. 
 
While the co-authors are under no illusion that this or any report could settle 
controversies that have been raging for centuries, we hope that it can contribute to a 
better informed and more open-minded discussion about how to proceed.  Although 
there is no way of resolving clashes over first principles, we believe that good will 
on all sides can often open a path to balanced approaches that respect and, to the 
greatest extent possible, accommodate competing claims. 
 
We are grateful to the Ford Foundation for its generous support of the Project on 
Religion, Policy and Politics, which has made this consultation and report possible.  
 
       
 
P A R T  O N E :   
C O N S C I E N C E  I N  G E N E R A L  
 
Conscience in religion and philosophy 
Conscience is generally regarded as an inner state or faculty linked to an awareness 
of moral limits and to the ability to distinguish right from wrong.  Different faiths 
and philosophical creeds offer varying accounts of the source of conscience—
reason, natural law, community, God’s law, or an unmediated encounter with the 
divine.  But they agree that conscience is something individuals experience and 
invoke as a source of moral guidance.  This is not to say that a group, even one as 
large as a nation, may not have similar conscientious reactions to shared 
experiences (Germany after World War II is an example of this).  Still, conscience 
is collective only by analogy.  Many traditions, moreover, see conscience as the 
source of the discomfort we feel when we act in ways that we know we should not 
and of the self-criticism that attends the violation of obligations or commands.  But 
conscience is not merely negative.  For three millennia, philosophers as well as 
pious believers have cited conscience as a source of affirmative obligations as well. 
 
Beyond these broad commonalities, faith traditions offer divergent accounts of 
conscience.  For Catholics, conscience is a faculty for the apprehension of practical 
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truth, including the core propositions of natural law.  Because all human beings are 
endowed with this faculty and because practical truth is one and the same for 
everyone everywhere, conscience in principle tends toward agreement.  Catholic 
thinkers thus encounter two challenges—accounting for legitimate conscientious 
disagreement, and offering principled grounds for respecting the outcome of 
conscientious but erring moral reflection. 
 
Some moral disagreement stems from distortions external to moral reflection rightly 
understood—from self-interest, passion, or willful disregard of considerations 
relevant to moral judgment.  But not all disagreement is the product of such 
distortion.  Practical reasoning involves not only the major premises that natural law 
principles supply, but also minor premises drawn from actual social conditions and 
personal circumstances.  So legitimate moral disagreement can arise when 
individuals differ in their assessment of facts on the ground, or concerning the 
impact of specific proposals on these facts.  During the debate over welfare reform 
in the mid-1990s, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan delivered an 
impassioned speech denouncing the legislation then on the floor, the enactment of 
which, he declared, would condemn a million children to a life of homelessness 
“sleeping on heating grates.”  If this had turned out to be the case, it would have 
represented a decisive moral argument against passing the bill.  Although the bill 
became law, it did not lead to the horrendous consequences Moynihan feared.  He 
was wrong, conscientiously wrong, in a manner worthy of respect. 
 
There is another, even more fundamental source of legitimate conscientious 
disagreement.  Contemporary theorists have argued that natural law offers a 
multiplicity of principles, each of which constitutes a defensible aim of action, and 
that these principles do not come packaged in a neat hierarchy.  If, as is typically 
the case, a moral choice brings more than one such principle into play, it is not 
always clear how they are to be balanced, or which should enjoy priority over the 
others.  And individuals can conscientiously disagree as to how this should be 
done.30 
 
These cases offer clear examples of moral differences that merit neither disapproval 
nor suppression.  But there are good reasons for broadening further the range of 
tolerable if not commendable disagreements.  It is valuable for individuals to 
recognize and correct their mistakes through internal processes of self-criticism and 
moral growth, processes that external coercion can thwart.  The tranquility and 
good order of the community, moreover, may require more scope for disagreement 
than the merits of particular views might otherwise suggest.        
 
                                                 
30 For a well-known discussion of these issues, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
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While differences among Protestant denominations are significant, one may hazard 
some generalizations.  Protestants are less likely than Catholics to see conscience in 
close relation to natural law, or indeed to reason.  We know only what God’s grace 
allows, and human beings experience that grace in different ways.  To be sure, for 
many Protestants, shared communal understandings shape the development and 
content of conscience.  Still, conscience has a subjective as well as objective 
component, based on what one leading Protestant theologian calls the “free personal 
center” that each individual possesses.  This freedom contributes to the “last best 
judgment” in moral matters—our resting-point after inquiry and reflection—that 
many Protestants and secular thinkers see as the manifestation of conscience in 
action.  Conversely, there is an obvious objection to situating conscience too 
comfortably within communities (even faith communities): because individual 
conscience may require standing up to majorities or authorities within one’s 
community of origin, any viable account of conscience must make room for a locus 
of moral judgment not reducible to communal norms. 
 
While the scope of individual freedom is unclear, it includes at the very least our 
various understandings of the modes of worship and other duties individuals owe to 
God.  As James Madison put it in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments, “It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such 
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”   
 
This duty has two key political implications.  It is the basis of a right of religious 
liberty—an inalienable right—that every individual may rightly claim against all 
others.  As such, it limits the legitimate purview of legislative majorities.  Further, 
our duties to God take priority over the claims of civil society and serve as 
reservations against civil authority.  The Protestant conception of conscience thus 
establishes a basis for conscientious objections to laws and regulations that 
individuals regard as going beyond appropriate bounds, and also for demands that 
civil authorities “accommodate” what conscience dictates. 
 
By contrast, the idea of conscience does not fit comfortably into a Jewish 
framework, the principal focus of which is law.  It would be caricature to suggest 
that Judaism lacks an awareness of or concern for the domain of individual 
inwardness.  Indeed, there are long-standing tensions between legalists and 
advocates of increased attention to inward spirituality and feeling.  But Jews tend 
not to see inwardness as the basis of special individual insight into the duties we 
owe to God or to one another.  The emphasis is on orthopraxy rather than 
orthodoxy, so much so that Maimonides’ effort to lay down a core of mandatory 
beliefs—a creed—set off a controversy within Judaism that has raged for nearly a 
millennium. 
 
Jews took it for granted that Jewish authorities should govern according to Jewish 
law (halacha).  To the extent that authorities did so, there could be no conflict 
between civil dictates and religious requirements.  But for nearly two thousand 
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years, every Jew lived under non-Jewish authorities.  The halacha responded by 
establishing a strong presumption in favor of obeying duly constituted authority, 
whatever form it might take.  The operative principle was dina d’malchuta dina: the 
law of the (secular) kingdom is law.   
 
Still, this presumption had limits.  Jews were forbidden to obey three legal 
commands—to commit murder, incest, or idolatry—and to pay for their 
disobedience with their lives if necessary.  (Martyrdom for these three causes—and 
for them only—is called “sanctifying God’s name.”)  Jews resisted and then 
revolted when Hellenistic rulers ordered them to bow down before Greek gods, and 
some of the most famous rabbis were executed by the Romans after rejecting orders 
to cease teaching Jewish law to their students.  While these episodes resemble 
conscientious refusal, they had nothing to do with an individual inner sense of right 
and wrong.  They were rooted, rather, in legal norms known to most Jews and 
binding on all. 
 
It would be misleading to stop at this point, however.  While the halacha took the 
written Torah—the five books of Moses—as its point of departure, it developed 
through centuries of interpretation that were eventually organized and summarized 
in the Talmud.  This process of interpretation is every bit as complex and 
controversial as are the interpretive practices the U.S. Supreme Court employs.  
Some rabbis took the view that norms of morality, humanity, and simple decency 
could be known outside the law and served as free-standing constraints on 
interpretive conclusions.  For example, while the written Torah prescribed the death 
penalty for a considerable range of offenses, the rabbis reinterpreted courts’ 
procedural requirements to rule it out in many of these cases.   
 
One might say that the human capacity to grasp law-shaping moral norms—a 
capacity some Talmudic scholars reject in principle—would be the Jewish 
equivalent of conscience.  And there is another possible Jewish analogy to 
conscience.  Some contemporary scholars argue that Judaism contains a version of 
natural law—namely, the covenant that God made with Noah.  Through reason and 
experience, all human beings,  not just Jews, could apprehend the terms of this 
covenant.  To be “god-fearing” was to regard these terms as the basis for judging, 
and when necessary resisting, the demands of civil authorities.  The Egyptian 
midwives were god-fearing because they resisted carrying out Pharoah’s murderous 
orders. 
 
The location of conscience in an inner domain raises questions about its relation to 
the world of individual action and social relations.  Is this realm of inwardness open 
to coercion, even in principle?  John Locke famously answered in the negative.  
Both faith and conscience, he declared, consist in the “inward persuasion of the 
mind. . . . And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled 
to the belief of anything by outward force.”  Martin Luther took a similar position.  
But Jonas Proast, Locke’s persistent antagonist, offered a counter-argument that 
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many contemporary commentators regard as persuasive.  So did Edmund Burke.  If 
conscience is more than an “inner light,” if it is shaped to some extent by 
community norms and public law, then it is hard to maintain the view that it is an 
inner citadel sealed off from the world.  On the other hand, some individuals 
display an unusual capacity to stand apart from community and polity when they 
judge that circumstances require such distancing, a moral potential that no 
acceptable account of conscience can deny. 
 
Although conscience is closely linked to at least some religions (placing non-
western and non-theistic faiths within a Christian template raises complex 
interpretive issues), it is found within secular contexts as well.  Among 
philosophical traditions, Greek and Roman Stoicism and Immanuel Kant’s practical 
philosophy offer especially well-developed understandings.  For Kant, conscience is 
rooted in our awareness of the inner freedom that gives us our inalienable capacity 
for moral agency.  Even when we act so as to degrade others or ourselves, we can 
never expunge our ability to judge the wrong we have committed and to act rightly 
in the future. 
 
Secular conscience manifests itself in professional contexts as well.  Becoming a 
physician means entering into a dense network of moral responsibilities to one’s 
patients and society.  At times this creed sets physicians in opposition to medical 
authorities and even the law of the state.  Norms of doctor-patient confidentiality 
can collide with the requirements of legal proceedings, and the law does not always 
exempt from disclosure communications that professionals and their clients regard 
as private and privileged.  Similar issues arise in journalism: from time to time, 
reporters go to jail rather than reveal the names of sources to whom they have 
promised confidentiality.        
 
Conscience in U.S. constitutional history 
There is no guarantee that any nation’s legal structure will reflect the core claims of 
conscience.  In this respect, among others, U.S. constitutional history is fraught with 
ambiguity.  Madison’s original draft of what became the First Amendment would 
have protected “the full and equal rights of conscience.”  By the close of the House 
debate, the language included protections for both the free exercise of religion and 
rights of conscience, implying a distinction between them.  After moving back and 
forth between these two formulations, the Senate ultimately selected religious free 
exercise, which became the language sent to the states for ratification. 
 
On its face, as Michael McConnell has observed, this legislative history points 
unequivocally toward a single interpretation of the constitutional language.  Either 
the framers viewed conscience and religion as coextensive, or they saw them as 
different but opted to protect religion rather than conscience.  In either case, claims 
of conscience lacking a religious basis would fall outside the realm of constitutional 
protection. 
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If religious but not secular claims of conscience are potentially eligible for 
constitutional protection, then legislators and courts have no choice but to reach the 
question of what religion is and what distinguishes it from other comprehensive 
world views.  Given America’s religious demography during the founding period, it 
would be natural for the framers to regard belief in a “creator”—the source of 
transcendent rights and duties—as the defining and distinguishing feature of 
religion.  But as the makeup of America’s population has become more diverse, 
especially in recent decades, pressure on that definition has intensified.  Can the law 
really draw a bright-line distinction between Christianity, Judaism and Islam, on the 
one hand, and Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism on the other?  Or would doing 
so eviscerate the robust religious freedom promised by the First Amendment? 
 
It might seem more defensible to distinguish between world views based 
exclusively on reason and experience, and those relying on revelation or a direct 
relationship with the divine.  But complications abound here as well.  After all, no 
less authoritative document than the Declaration of Independence characterizes 
certain truths as “self-evident,” including the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s 
God,” which the document proceeds to spell out with considerable particularity.  So 
while the Declaration has an unmistakably theological foundation, which some 
scholars characterize as Deist rather than specifically Christian, its foundational 
truths are in principle equally accessible to the reason of all human beings, 
regardless of other creedal differences.  In practice, how can the law distinguish 
between this religion of reason and other comprehensive views, such as Kantianism, 
that claim an exclusively rational foundation for binding duties?  If we say that the 
Declaration’s rational religion includes a “creator” in distinction to other reason-
based views, we have returned to the problem of excluding non-western creedal 
communities from the ambit of the Constitution. 
 
In the end, then, it is not surprising that U.S. Supreme Court interpretation moved in 
a more capacious direction.  As early as World War I, The American Civil Liberties 
Union unsuccessfully brought suit on behalf of individuals who conscientiously 
objected to military service on moral rather than religious grounds.  Nearly half a 
century later, during the Vietnam Era, this broader view prevailed.  Section 6(j) of 
the Universal Military Training and Service Act invoked the traditional view by 
making draft exemptions available to those who were conscientiously opposed to 
military service by reason of “religious training and belief.”  The Act proceeded to 
define the required religious conviction as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, 
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code.”  In United States v. Seeger (1965), however, the 
Supreme Court broadened the statutory definition by interpreting the Act to include 
a “sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of the possessor a place 
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”  
Five years later, in Welsh v. United States, the Court further expanded the reach of 
the statute to include explicitly secular beliefs that “play the role of a religion and 
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function as a religion in life.”  Thus, exemptions could be extended to “those whose 
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give 
them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become part of an instrument 
[of war].”  Through a process of statutory interpretation, the Court gave force to an 
understanding of conscience that the framers of the First Amendment did not 
contemplate, or rejected outright.  (This did not end the judicial search for a 
definition of religion under the First Amendment, however.) 
 
There is a further complication: within the military context, there is a distinction 
between comprehensive and selective conscientious objectors.  The former oppose 
all wars, while the latter differentiate between just and unjust wars.  Invoking the 
principles of just war theory, which initially claimed religious foundations, selective 
objectors can say that a particular war is unjustified because it represents an act of 
aggression rather than self-defense.  Or they can say that while the war is justified 
in principle, it is being conducted unjustly—for example, by targeting civilians in 
violation of the principle of noncombatant immunity.  The difficulty is that just war 
theory includes criteria, such as proportionality of means to ends, whose application 
verges on the types of contestable practical judgments that fall within the purview 
of political authorities.  If conscience is extended too far, it becomes 
indistinguishable from political decision-making.  And it is hard to argue that each 
individual may judge such matters for him/herself in the face of duly enacted 
democratic legislation to the contrary—unless one is willing to embrace principled 
anarchy.  “Conscience” must be defined and applied as a check on majorities, not as 
a substitute for collective decision-making.    
 
A final complication: Whatever else it may be, conscience is undoubtedly an inner 
state of belief and motivation, while law is most at home defining and judging 
actions.  Any attempt to assess the sincerity of belief entangles courts in inquiries 
that could be viewed as invading freedom of conscience itself.  The 
counterargument is that those who invoke conscientious objections to otherwise 
valid laws voluntarily open themselves to these inquiries.  The reasoning is 
straightforward: because law typically restricts choice and requires us to do things 
we would prefer not to, we are all motivated to escape its burdens.  Unless courts 
can investigate our motives for claiming exemptions, everyone could mouth the 
language of legally recognized exemptions, and laws would become unenforceable.  
Still, such inquiries are complex and perilous.  The external indicia of sincerity are 
less than reliable.  And if courts try to reason from the sincerity of the believer to 
the credibility of the belief, many religions would fail the test.  By definition, all 
miracles defy the laws of nature, and it is hard to see what makes one purported 
miracle more or less credible than the next.  Surely courts cannot “grandfather” 
religions whose miracles have been long and widely accepted while subjecting 
newer faiths to stricter scrutiny.  Indeed, the Court has said “[t]he determination of 
what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate 
task,” but “the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of 
the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, 
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logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.”31 
 
Difficulties such as these have led some jurists to question the entire enterprise of 
extending religion- or conscience-based exemptions and accommodations from 
generally valid statutes.  In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected the 
claims of individuals who invoked the Native American practice of sacramental 
peyote-smoking as a defense against Oregon’s controlled substances law.32  The 
Court considered whether the Constitution permits the State of Oregon to deny 
unemployment benefits to persons fired from their jobs because of religiously 
inspired use of peyote.  Its answer was “yes.” The Court deemed the law at issue to 
be neutral toward religion and generally applicable.   Thus, it said, there was no 
need to provide exemptions from the law for religiously motivated conduct.  The 
majority declared that “Any society adopting such a system would be courting 
anarchy” and that this danger “increases in direct proportion to the society’s 
diversity of religious beliefs and its determination to coerce or suppress none of 
them.”  Within very broad limits, legislators are free to enact such exemptions and 
accommodations as they see fit. But individuals may not claim them as a matter of 
right under the First Amendment.  The majority acknowledged the risks their 
holding entailed: “It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in.”  But this outcome represents the lesser evil, the Court said, and 
“must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself . . .” 
 
Smith proved to be one of the most unpopular decisions the modern Supreme Court 
has ever handed down.  An aroused religious and civil liberties community backed 
by organizations across the ideological spectrum came together to draft and lobby 
for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which passed the House 
unanimously and the Senate by a vote of 97 to 3.  President Bill Clinton signed it 
into law in the fall of 1993.  
 
RFRA sought to restore the constitutional understanding of free exercise that 
prevailed before Smith: the law should not substantially burden the free exercise of 
religion unless the government can demonstrate that it does so in furtherance of a 
compelling interest, and with the least intrusive and restrictive means that 
effectively promote that interest.  The Supreme Court subsequently struck down 
RFRA as applied to the states33 but has continued to apply it to the activities of the 
federal government.34   
 
                                                 
31 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)(citations omitted). 
32 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
33 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
34 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 
(2005).  
  
Health Care Providers’ Consciences and Patients’ Needs: The Quest for Balance 
14 
 
P A R T  T W O :  
C O N S C I E N C E  I N  T H E  C O N T E X T  O F  H E A L T H  C A R E  
 
General considerations 
For moral or religious reasons, some health care providers object to providing 
certain medical services.  The classic case is a physician who refuses to perform an 
abortion, but that is far from the only one.  Some nurses, hospital orderlies, medical 
administrative staff, emergency medical technicians, and pharmacists have been 
unwilling to assist in the provision of particular health care services, and objections 
have been raised not only about abortions but also about contraceptives, 
sterilizations, assisted suicide, reproductive technology, blood transfusions, and 
stem-cell research.   
 
Some health care institutions have raised similar objections, citing the convictions 
of the religious communities sponsoring them.   Hospitals have refused to provide 
abortions and sterilizations, pharmacies have declined to stock items like 
emergency contraception, and employers have objected to mandates requiring their 
health plans to cover the costs of employees’ prescription contraceptives. 
 
Who should be permitted to refuse to provide, assist, or pay for services in these 
situations?  Should objections to any service be honored, or only acts the objector 
would view as the taking of human life?  What institutions, if any, should be 
permitted to refuse to offer particular health care services?  What about the 
competing interest of access to health care, including the claims of those who say 
they seek and provide health care services as a matter of conscience?  Can these 
competing interests be harmonized, at least at times, or must one always trump the 
other?  What is current law and policy on these issues?  What should it be?   
 
We turn now to these issues.  To set the stage for this discussion, we first touch on 
the nature of the health care profession and conscientious objections within that 
context.   
Health care professionals and institutions have traditionally had a great deal of 
freedom to refuse to perform particular services and take certain patients.  
According to bioethicist Holly Fernandez Lynch, “Existing case law and statements 
of professional ethics convey the well-established rule that initiation of the 
physician-patient relationship is entirely voluntary for both parties.  Physicians are 
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free to refuse to accept a prospective patient for any reason not prohibited by law or 
contract, such as discriminatory bases for refusal.”35   
Once physicians have entered into relationships with patients, they are expected to 
act in the patients’ best interests.  That does not necessarily mean they are required 
to do whatever the patient asks, however.  Doctors exercise professional judgment 
in caring for and serving patients, including judgments about ethical matters.   
Likewise, doctors generally may choose to specialize in some areas and not others 
and to limit their practices so that they perform some procedures and not others.  
For example, a physician may choose to practice gynecology and not obstetrics.   
Hospitals and other health care institutions typically enjoy similar latitude.  As 
Columbia University Law School Professor Kent Greenawalt has explained: “If we 
put aside life-saving medical procedures and avoidance of medical malpractice (as 
performing some operations without blood transfusions), hospitals can commonly 
decline to perform operations private patients might desire, including abortions, 
sterilizations, and elective plastic surgery.”36   
Put simply, the freedom to form patient relationships and to choose which services 
to offer is “the norm in the health care setting.”37  Thus, when individuals and 
institutions refuse to provide certain services for moral or religious reasons, it is 
often understood as an acceptable and unremarkable feature of this system.   
At the same time, state licensing of health care professionals and institutions to 
provide services that are essential to human health creates ethical as well as legal 
responsibilities.  Through such licensing, the government gives these individuals 
and institutions an exclusive right to offer health care services.  No one argues 
that this monopoly requires every doctor and every hospital to offer all health 
care services.  But most agree it creates some obligation for the health care 
profession to ensure that needed services are provided to patients in a timely and 
competent manner.   
 
Also, conscientious objectors often request exemptions from broad policy and 
legal requirements.  Thus, these claims must be considered carefully, and an 
important factor in that analysis is the cost to the state of making exceptions from 
rules that may represent important health care objectives. 
                                                 
35 Holly Fernandez Lynch, Conscientious Refusals by Physicians in The Penn Center Guide to 
Bioethics (Springer Publishing Co. March 2009) 159, 161 (citation omitted)(hereinafter 
“Conscientious Refusals”).  
36 Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be 
Accommodated? 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 47, 54 (2010)(hereinafter “Refusals of Conscience”). 
37 Julie Cantor and Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection – May Pharmacists Refuse to 
Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception? 351 New England Journal of Medicine, 2008, 
2009 (2004)(hereinafter “The Limits of Conscientious Objection”). 
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Understanding the debate over conscientious objection in the health care field 
requires attention to these traditional liberties and responsibilities.   
 
Another key to understanding the debate is appreciating its relationship to the 
continuing battle over abortion.  During our day-long interdisciplinary convening to 
discuss conscience in the context of health care, theologian and bioethicist Gilbert 
Meilaender said: “[W]e should remember that we would not be having this 
conversation here today were it not for the issue of abortion and the way that has 
deeply divided our country.”38  To be sure, Meilaender noted, there are other claims 
of conscience in the health care field, but abortion is “the fundamental issue.” For 
Meilaender, the deep divisions over abortion are “a powerful reason not to require 
any individual or institution to do it.”39 
 
Sharp differences over abortion animate the conscience debate in other ways.  
Professor Alta Charo explains:  
 
Some health care providers … distinguish between medical care and 
nonmedical care that uses medical services.  In this way, they justify their 
willingness to bind the wounds of the criminal before sending him back to 
the street or to set the bones of a battering husband that were broken when 
he struck his wife.  Birth control, abortion, and in vitro fertilization, they 
say, are lifestyle choices, not treatments for disease. 40   
 
Others vehemently reject this characterization, asserting that reproductive services 
are essential to women’s health, dignity, and equality.  Reducing abortion and 
contraception to “notions of convenience, elective services you can just find if you 
want [them],” is deeply troubling, they say.41   
 
The conscience question is not whether particular health services are legitimate, but 
whether an individual or institutional provider has the liberty to abstain from 
providing them due to religious or moral objections.  Nonetheless, it often proves 
difficult to divorce these matters.  
 
To understand current debate over conscientious objection in the health care field, 
one must also appreciate the ways in which the new federal health care reform law 
is changing this landscape.  An example is the recent debate over the HHS ruling 
requiring most new health insurance plans to cover contraceptives and sterilization 
procedures without co-pays or deductibles. Does the accommodation announced by 
                                                 
38 In conversation with authors at The Brookings Institution, June 6, 2011. 
39 Id. 
40  R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience – Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 N. 
Engl. J. Med. 2471 (June 16, 2005).  
41 Tracy Weitz in conversation with the authors at The Brookings Institution, June 6, 2011.   
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the Obama Administration on February 10, 2012 sufficiently protect the rights and 
interests of all the stakeholders? A number of states have already addressed these 
matters, but regulations issued pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Health Care Act of 2010 are the first federal rules to tackle these subjects.  
 
In the sections of the paper that follow, we describe aspects of current law and 
policy on conscience in the health care context and certain contours of the debate 
about what law and policy should be.  The final section of the paper offers some 
suggestions for policymakers as they address issues in this field.   
 
Current law on conscience in the health care context 
In the health care context, conscience laws protect medical providers and 
institutions that refuse to provide certain services due to their religious or moral 
objections to such services.  The U.S. Constitution and many state constitutions 
generally do not mandate these kinds of protections for conscientious objectors, 42  
but they often permit the legislative and executive branches of government to 
extend them.   The federal government and most state governments have done so in 
a variety of ways.   
 
Federal law and regulation 
Several major federal laws protect conscientious objections in the health care field.  
Congress passed a series of these measures in the 1970s.  With these provisions, 
Congress made it clear that individuals and institutions must be excused from 
providing services that are morally or religiously objectionable to them in many 
cases.    
 
Congress passed a law weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decisions in Roe 
v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton striking down certain state laws restricting abortion.43  
This law is known as the Church Amendment for its leading proponent, Idaho 
Senator Frank Church.  In the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, there were 
                                                 
42 So long as laws and other governmental action are generally applicable and neutral toward 
religion, they do not offend the free exercise clauses of these constitutions.  See Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 
Rutgers J. Law & Religion 139 (2009).    See also infra 21-22.  Also, claims of conscience divorced 
from religious concerns fall outside the ambit of the First Amendment and similar state 
constitutional provisions.  However, some state courts have interpreted the free exercise clauses of 
their state constitutions to provide much more protection for religious exercise.  See Douglas 
Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 Rutgers J. Law & Religion 139, 142 & n.16 (2009).   
Also, a federal statute and some state statutes provide additional protection for free exercise rights.  
See infra 21-22. 
43 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusals, 21 The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics 163 (2010); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  In Doe v. Bolton, the 
Court said statutory provisions excusing individuals and hospitals from performing abortions were 
“appropriate protection.”  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973). 
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efforts to pressure some physicians and health care institutions to perform abortions 
or sterilizations despite their conscientious objections.  These efforts were often 
premised on the fact that the health care institution or individual received federal 
funds.44  
 
In response, Congress said the receipt of certain federal funds could not serve as the 
basis for requirements that objecting individuals or institutions perform abortions or 
sterilizations or make facilities or personnel available to perform these 
procedures.45  It also banned employment discrimination on these grounds.  The 
Church Amendment prohibits employers from penalizing a medical professional 
due to his or her refusal to perform a lawful sterilization or abortion or willingness 
to perform such procedures.46  Similarly, the Amendment bars entities from 
discriminating on these bases regarding “the extension of staff or other privileges to 
any physician or other health care personnel.”47 
Through passage of the National Research Act in 1974,48 Congress added new 
provisions to the Church Amendment,49ones stating that individuals cannot be 
required to perform or assist in performing “any part of a health service program 
or research activity” funded by the Department of Health and Human Services if 
doing so would be objectionable to the individual for religious or moral 
reasons.50  Likewise, an entity receiving federal funding for biomedical or 
behavioral research may not discriminate in employment or in the extension of 
staff privileges based on a person’s “performance of any lawful health service or 
research activity” or refusal to do so for reasons of conscience. 51   
Congress added another provision to the Church Amendment in 1979.  This 
provision prohibits entities receiving certain federal funds from discriminating in 
admissions for medical training or study based on a person’s reluctance or 
willingness “to counsel, suggest, recommend, assist, or in any way participate” in 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973). 
45 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-7(b)(1) and (2). 
46 Id. at Section 300a-7(c)(1)(A). 
47 Id. at Section 300a-7(c)(1)(B). 
48 Public Law 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).  A firestorm of public criticism of the Tuskegee syphilis 
study led to the passage of this legislation.  In this U.S. Public Health Service study, hundreds of 
low-income African American men who were suffering from syphilis were monitored for decades, 
but these men were neither informed about the specific nature of their disease nor treated for it.  See 
History of Research Ethics, Office of Graduate Studies, University of Nevada Las Vegas at 
http://research.unlv.edu/ORI-HSR/history-ethics.htm; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
U.S. Public Health Service Act Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm. 
49 42 U.S.C. at Section 300a-7(d).    
50 Id. at Section 300a-7(d). 
51 Id. at Section 300a-7c(2). 
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abortions or sterilizations due to the individual’s moral convictions or religious 
beliefs.52   
Decades later Congress drafted other laws extending these principles.  When 
accreditation standards threatened to require hospitals to provide abortions or 
abortion training and referrals in the 1990s, Congress prohibited federally funded 
governmental bodies from penalizing any individual or entity for refusing to receive 
or provide abortion training and referrals or perform abortions.53  And in 2004 and 
every subsequent year, Congress has said federal funds cannot be used to 
discriminate against any individual or entity because it refuses to provide, pay for, 
provide coverage, or make referrals for abortions.54 
 
None of these statutes were supported by regulations until 2008.  In the final days 
of the George W. Bush administration, the Department of Health and Human 
Services issued such a regulation.55  The Department said it was concerned about 
growing intolerance toward conscience protections in the health care field and “[a] 
trend that isolates and excludes some among various religious, cultural, and/or 
ethnic groups from participating in the delivery of health care.” 56   
 
The regulation was not intended to expand the protections of the federal conscience 
statutes but rather to enforce them, the Department said.  At the same time, HHS 
emphasized that the rule was “to be interpreted and implemented broadly to 
effectuate [its] protections.”57  The rule provided definitions for various terms in 
these statutes.  For example, it said “assist in the performance” meant “to participate 
in any activity with a reasonable connection to a procedure, health service or health 
service program, or research activity. . . .”58   It also required certain recipients of 
health care funds to certify compliance with these federal statutes in writing.  
Finally, the rule designated the HHS Office of Civil Rights as the entity to receive 
complaints concerning violations of these statutes.   
 
This regulation was deeply controversial.  Opponents of the regulation filed 
lawsuits against it, while advocates of the rule enthusiastically defended it.  
 
                                                 
52 Id. at Section 300a-7(e). 
53 Id. Section 238n (2011). 
54 Annual rider to Health and Human Services/Labor Appropriations Bill, recently re-enacted as part 
of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. F, Section 508(d)(1) (March 
11, 2009).  This paper does not provide an exhaustive description of federal conscience clause laws.  
For a fuller account of such laws, see, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience 
Clauses and Conscientious Refusals, 21 The Journal of Clinical Ethics 163 (2010). 
55 73 Fed. Reg. 78071 (December 19, 2008); 45 CFR Part 88 (2008).   
56 Id. at 78073. 
57 Id. at 78097.   
58 Id. 
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Shortly after President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, the Department 
of Health and Human Services proposed rescinding this regulation in its entirety, 
and it did rescind most of the regulation on February 23, 2011.59   HHS said the rule 
created more confusion than clarity; improperly expanded the conscience statutes, 
mostly through the creation of overly broad definitions for statutory terms; and 
threatened access to reproductive services like contraception.  It rescinded the 
definitions and the certification requirement, but HHS retained the portion of the 
rule charging the Department’s Office of Civil Rights with educating the health care 
field about these federal statutes and enforcing them.  Even as it rescinded most of 
the 2008 rule, HHS stressed that the federal statutory conscience protection laws 
would remain unchanged.60  As discussed previously, the implementation of federal 
health care reform law has led to the issuance of another regulation implicating 
conscience issues, one mandating coverage for contraception and sterilization 
services in most new group health insurance plans.61   
 
State law 
Most states have enacted laws protecting conscientious objectors in the health care 
field.  According to a 2011 report by the Guttmacher Institute: 
 
• 46 states have laws allowing some health care providers to refuse to perform 
abortion-related services, and 44 states permit health care institutions to 
refuse to provide abortions.62  
 
• 18 states honor the objections of some health care providers to providing 
sterilization services, and 16 states allow health care institutions to refuse to 
do so.  
 
• 14 states allow some health care providers to refuse to provide contraceptive 
services.  Six states explicitly allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense 
contraceptives for moral or religious reasons.63 
  
A growing number of states also have statutes on their books known as 
“contraceptive equity laws.”  These laws require employers to offer prescriptive 
contraceptives to their employees as part of their health care plans, if those plans 
cover other prescriptive drugs and devices.  According to a November 2010 report 
                                                 
59 Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Final Rule, Regulation for the Enforcement 
of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws (February 23, 2011) at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-23/pdf/2011-3993.pdf 
60 Id. 
61 See supra 1-5. 
62 Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Refusing to Provide Health Services (February 1, 
2012) at  http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf 
63 Id. See also Jody Feder, Federal and State Laws Regarding Pharmacists Who Refuse to Dispense 
Contraceptives at CRS-2 (Congressional Research Services, October 7, 2005).    
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by the National Women’s Law Center, twenty-six states have such laws.64  Some of 
these laws contain exemptions for certain employers having religious objections to 
the use of contraception, though these exemptions vary in terms of the breadth of 
religious entities they cover. 65    
 
Federal and state law on religious nondiscrimination and 
accommodation 
All of the federal and state laws that make room for conscientious objections in the 
context of health care recognize religious objections.  But faith-based objections are 
given added protection through more general laws aimed at prohibiting religious 
discrimination and providing religious accommodation.   
 
For example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 requires the 
federal government to justify any substantial burdens it places on religious exercise 
with a compelling government interest and to demonstrate that its promotion of that 
interest places only the most minimal burden possible on religious exercise. 66   It 
protects the religious exercise of both individuals and institutions from 
governmental interference.  Some states have statutes like the federal RFRA and 
others interpret their constitutions to provide similar protection.67   
  
Individuals with religious objections to providing certain health care services also 
sometimes invoke workplace nondiscrimination statutes such as Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.68  Title VII requires employers with fifteen or more 
employees to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee’s sincere 
religious beliefs, practices, and observances, if doing so would not create an undue 
hardship for the employer. 69  The Supreme Court has said the term “undue 
                                                 
64 National Women’s Law Center, Contraceptive Equity Laws in Your State: You’re your Rights- 
Use Your Rights, A Consumer Guide (November 30, 2010) at 
http://www.nwlc.org/resource/contraceptive-equity-laws-your-state-know-your-rights-use-your-
rights-consumer-guide-0.  The United States Conference for Catholic Bishops has noted that two 
additional states, Michigan and Washington, have administrative rules or regulations to similar 
effect.  See Comments of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops on Interim Final Rules 
on Preventive Services File Code CMS-9992-IFC2 (August 21, 2011) at 
http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-preventive-
services-2011-08.pdf 
65 See supra 1-5 for a discussion of a related federal regulation.  
66 42 U.S.C. Section 20000bb-4 (2011).  In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the application 
of RFRA to states and localities.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  RFRA 
continues to apply to the actions of the federal government.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, 546 
U.S. 418 (2006).   
67 See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 Rutgers J. Law & Religion 139, 142 
& nn.16 & 17 (2009).    
68 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e (2011).     
69 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(j) states: “The term ‘religion' includes all aspects of religious observance 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
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hardship” means anything more than a de minimis cost or burden.70  Thus, if an 
employer can demonstrate that accommodating the employee would create more 
than a minimal burden or cost, the employer need not make the adjustment.71  Title 
VII accommodation protections have often been invoked by conscientious objectors 
in the health care field, sometimes successfully.72  States and many localities have 
similar prohibitions on work place discrimination.73   
 
Can governmental accommodation of religious practices sometimes violate the 
Constitution?  Yes.  The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits the 
government from singling out religious practices and institutions for 
accommodation in ways that would markedly burden nonbeneficiaries, for 
example.74  In a 2005 case, a unanimous Supreme Court said: “[C]ourts must take 
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries.”75  Many conscience laws and policies in the health care context, 
however, encompass objections rooted in ethical as well as religious convictions, 
and some seek to balance the burdens of the conscience objector against the burdens 
borne by the person needing health care services.  Laws and policies singling out 
religious institutions and practices for special exemptions and providing absolute 
protection for them may be more vulnerable to constitutional attack.76  
 
 
What law and policy should be:  
Areas of agreement and disagreement 
 
In addition to describing what current law is on these issues, this paper also seeks to 
map some of the contours of the debate about what the law and policy should be.   
This debate focuses on a number of key questions, including:  
 
• Who should be permitted to refuse to provide, pay for, or assist in the 
provision of certain heath care services? 
 
                                                                                                                                        
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without 
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.”  
70 Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
71 Id. 
72 See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee 
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 318 (2010). 
73 Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers: 
State of the Law 2002 (Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, December 2002) at 
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/faith-based_social_services/2002-12-
government_partnerships_with_faith-based_service_providers_state_of_the_law.pdf  
74 See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989).  
75 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). 
76 Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
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• Which institutions, if any, should be permitted to refuse to provide, pay for, 
or assist in the provision of certain heath care services? 
 
• What are appropriate grounds for conscientious refusals? 
 
• What should conscientious objectors be able refuse to do?  Should providers 
be able to raise an objection regarding any health care service, or just some 
of them?   
 
• What conditions must be present for conscientious objections to be 
honored? 
 
• What sort of rules should govern disclosures of conscientious objections, 
notifications regarding alternative providers, and referrals to other 
providers?   
 
We address each of these questions in turn.   
 
Who should be permitted to refuse to provide or assist in the provision of certain 
lawful heath care services? 
 
Should nurses as well as doctors be able to raise conscientious objections in the 
health care field?  What about hospital orderlies and pharmacists?   
 
Some would draw a line between doctors and everyone else.  Physicians should be 
permitted to decline to perform at least some services they find objectionable, they 
say, but nurses and others should be treated differently.  In their view, nurses 
merely assist while doctors perform the procedures.  Others believe, however, that 
nurses—and for some, other health care workers, too—should also be excused from 
performing or assisting in procedures they find morally objectionable.    
 
Rather than simply considering a job title, another approach is to consider the 
provider’s personal contact with patients.  Columbia University Law School 
Professor Kent Greenawalt has suggested the line might be drawn at those having 
“significant personal contact with patients.” Greenawalt explains: “So long as there 
is no significant personal contact with the patients, I do not think everyone remotely 
connected to patients, including those who type their forms, make their beds, dish 
out their meals, and clean their rooms, should have a right of conscience to refuse 
based on the procedure the patient undergoes.”77 Applying this standard, 
Greenawalt suggests it would be possible to distinguish between nurses and 
pharmacists, for example, because a pharmacist’s contact with those seeking 
                                                 
77 Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. at 27. 
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contraceptives is much more remote than a nurse’s contact with a patient seeking an 
abortion.78  
 
A related approach focuses on the health care worker’s tie to the objectionable 
procedure.  A narrow view would only honor objections to direct participation in 
the procedure itself.  A much broader view would also excuse an objector from 
participating in any other care for the patient, such as pre- or post-operative care.79   
 
Regardless of which of these standards is applied, most agree that if an individual 
objects to a large portion of the duties required by a particular line of work, the 
individual’s conscience claim is weak.  A federal court put it this way in the context 
of a Title VII religious accommodation claim:  An employer does not have to 
accommodate an employee when the employee’s objections would render him 
“unable to perform a substantial proportion of the duties of a particular position.”80  
While there is widespread agreement on this general principle, there are frequent 
disagreements about exactly what constitutes a “substantial proportion” of a health 
care worker’s duties.  
 
Which institutions, if any, should be permitted to refuse to provide, pay for, or 
assist in the provision of certain lawful heath care services? 
 
Should some institutions be allowed to refuse to provide certain health care services 
due to religious or moral objections to those procedures by their sponsoring 
communities?  Groups and institutions are often formed around shared notions of 
conscience and the rights of freedom of assembly and association apply to these 
groups.  If the group is religious, the rights of free exercise and religious autonomy 
apply as well.  Thus, some argue that refusing to recognize the ability of certain 
institutions to object to the provision of particular services would interfere with the 
liberties of these institutions and lead to an overly privatized notion of conscience, 
one cut off from the collective thought and traditions that often distinguish groups 
given to ethical, moral or religious reflection.  Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain 
highlights another dimension of this argument: “If you begin to eviscerate freedom 
of institutions, you in effect cut off conscience formation at its knees; that is, you 
                                                 
78 Id. at 20. 
79 See, e.g., Seth Augenstein, Twelve nurses accuse UMDNJ of forcing them to assist in abortion 
cases depiste religious and moral objections, New Jersey Star Ledger (November 14, 2011) at 
http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/print.html?entry=/2011/11/12_nurses_accuse_umdnj_of_fo
rc.html  (attorney for the nurses argues that they “would be assisting with the abortion even if they 
were taking down name, holding a patient’s hand during the procedure, or walking them to the 
door”).  See also Rob Stein, New Jersey Nurses Charge Discrimination Over Hospital Abortion 
Policy, The Washington Post (November 27, 2011) at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-jersey-nurses-charge-religious-
discrimination-over-hospital-abortion-policy/2011/11/15/gIQAydgm2N_story.html  See also supra 1 
for further discussion of this New Jersey case and 19-20 for broad definitions of statutory terms from 
now-defunct Bush conscience regulation.  
80 Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1184 (1979). 
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need institutions to generate conscience to help form people who have 
consciences.”81  
 
Others insist there is no justification for honoring conscientious objections raised by 
institutions.82  Institutions do not have a conscience, they note.  They also make a 
pragmatic argument: institutional objections often pose greater threats for access to 
health care services than individuals’ conscientious objections.  An institution may 
staff around the objections of individual health care workers.  But when an 
institution objects to the provision of certain health care services, even willing 
health care workers within that institution may be prevented from providing such 
care. 
Some have suggested that only religious entities should enjoy an institutional 
right of refusal.  These bodies have special rights to be free from state 
interference, including First Amendment rights to religious autonomy and free 
exercise.83  From America’s founding, they argue, it has been recognized that 
religious communities require the freedom to define themselves and practice their 
faith as they see fit rather than as government sees fit.  This freedom 
encompasses the liberty to establish and maintain communities that operate 
according to a set of religious beliefs and practices. 
Others say this kind of special treatment for religion is unconstitutional and 
wrongheaded.  “To single out one of the ways that persons come to understand 
what is important in life, and grant those who choose that way a license to 
disregard legal norms that the rest of us are obliged to obey is to defeat rather than 
fulfill our commitment to toleration,” legal scholars Christopher Eisgruber and 
Lawrence Sager argue.84  Especially because religion defies easy categorization, it 
is folly at best to try to define religion in law and policy and treat it differently, 
they claim.85  Further, questions are sometimes raised about whether religiously 
                                                 
81 In conversation with the authors at The Brookings Institution, June 6, 2011.(hereinafter quotes 
from June 6, 2011 convening cited as “Brookings discussion”). 
82 ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights Accessing 
Birth Control at the Pharmacy at 2.    
83 Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. at 12.  Professor Kent Greenawalt 
argues that, “[w]hen nonreligious organizations are created for particular purposes, such as 
medical care, there is much less reason to permit them to decline services that are generally 
required.”  Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 901, 916 
(2010). 
84 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1315 (1994).  For a 
critique of the proposals of Professors Eisgruber and Sager, see Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious 
Liberty Be Protected as Equality?  85 Tex. L. Rev. 1185 (2007).   
85 See, e.g., Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton, 2005). 
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affiliated health care institutions continue to serve a distinctive purpose today, 
particularly when these institutions are heavily dependent on government funds.86 
Where religious entities are exempted from certain health care mandates, there are 
fierce battles over the scope of those exemptions.  Sometimes the terms “religious 
organizations” or “religious employers” are defined broadly to include not only 
houses of worship but also faith-based nonprofits and religiously affiliated 
educational institutions at all levels.  This usually triggers an outcry from certain 
health care advocates who say these exemptions allow too many people working 
within or associated with religious institutions to be denied the benefits of the 
state’s health care mandates.  A narrow exemption for religious entities also draws 
serious opposition, albeit from different quarters. 87   
What are appropriate grounds for conscientious refusals? 
 
The federal and state statutes and regulations regarding conscience in the health 
care context protect the rights of individuals to raise moral or religious objections.  
This reflects the consensus view that it would be unfair to force individuals to 
perform abortions, for example, simply because their objections are rooted in ethics 
rather than religion.  Given the serious burdens it could place on similarly situated 
nonreligious health care providers, it could also raise questions about whether the 
state is favoring religion over nonreligion, something the First Amendment 
forbids.88   
Must conscientious objections have a “reasonable factual basis”?  Some would limit 
objections in the health care field in this way.  For example, the American Congress 
of Gynecologists and Obstetricians (ACOG) has said:  Because “a large body of 
published evidence” indicates that emergency contraception prevents fertilization 
rather than implantation, “provider refusals to dispense emergency contraception 
based on unsupported beliefs about its primary mechanism of action should not be 
justified.”89  At least when claims of faith are involved, however, this kind of 
                                                 
86 For example, Catholic theologian Daniel C. Maguire argues there was a need for Catholic 
hospitals in the United States years ago when no other institution was providing health care for the 
poor and non-governmental funds supported the work of these hospitals.  Now other institutions 
are providing such care, Maguire says, and Catholic hospitals are totally dependent on government 
funds.  Thus, Maguire suggests Catholic and other religiously affiliated hospitals “should be 
sunsetted.”  Brookings discussion. 
87 See, e.g., Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 527 (2004).  See also supra 1-6. 
88 Recognizing only the conscientious objections of religious individuals would burden more non-
beneficiaries than recognizing only the objections of religious institutions.  Few non-religious health 
care institutions assert ethical or moral objections to providing services like abortion and 
sterilization.   
89 Committee on Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee 
Opinion: The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine (November 2007) at 
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_Ethics/The
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requirement would seem to be in some tension with Supreme Court mandates.  The 
Court has said: “[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”90   
What about objections appearing to stem from a patient’s status rather than the 
nature of a particular service?   Some health care providers have said they will 
provide infertility services to married heterosexual couples, for example, but they 
will not provide such services to single women or same-sex married couples due to 
a religious or moral belief that children should only be reared by heterosexual 
married couples.  Are these appropriate grounds for conscientious refusals?   
Many say “no.”  Indeed, experts like Holly Fernandez Lynch say this is an easy 
call—“refusals based on objections to the patient who is requesting the service, 
rather than to the service itself, should be deemed unacceptable.”91  In 2008, the 
Supreme Court of California came to the same conclusion.92  When a lesbian 
sought fertility treatment at a clinic and was refused, she sued the clinic.  Some of 
the physicians associated with the clinic said their religious beliefs precluded them 
from performing the requested procedure for the patient.  The patient sued under a 
state law barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by businesses 
offering services to the public.93  The court held that the medical group was such a 
business, and it ruled in favor of the patient, finding that the nondiscrimination law 
advanced “California’s compelling interest in ensuring full and equal access to 
medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation, and there [was] no less 
restrictive means for the state to achieve that goal.”94  
Others believe this status-service distinction is not so clear.  Notre Dame Professor 
Cathleen Kaveny notes that there are a number of occasions where it is difficult to 
judge the morality of a service apart from the person to whom the service is given.  
A physician might tell a preteen, for example, that she is too young for sexual 
                                                                                                                                        
_Limits_of_Conscientious_Refusal_in_Reproductive_Medicine  (hereinafter “The Limits of 
Conscientious Refusals”).  See also Lynch, Conscientious Refusals at 165.  
90 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
91 Lynch, Conscientious Refusals at 165.  See also ACOG, The Limits of Conscientious Refusals at 4. 
92 North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 1145 (Sup. Ct. Calif. 
2008). 
93 The state statute involved in this case prohibits discrimination by businesses offering the public 
“accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services.”  Id. at  1153.  There is no universal 
definition of a “public accommodation,” but it usually is defined as a business or building where 
services are offered to the general public.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,  628 (1996).   A number of state statutes explicitly name 
institutions like hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies as public accommodations.  See, e.g., Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. Section 24-34-601 (2011); Wis. Stat. Sec. 106.52 (2011); Mass. Ann Laws ch. 272 Sec. 
92A (2011).  Whether this term accurately describes small medical practice groups is a matter of 
debate.   
94 North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th at 1158. 
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activity and thus also too young for birth control.95  Legal scholar Robin Fretwell 
Wilson agrees that the status-service distinction is not always bright, but she 
counsels that policymakers often see things this way, particularly when 
conscientious objections are connected to sexual orientation or gender.96  
What should objectors be able to refuse to do?  Should providers be able to raise 
an objection regarding any health care service, or just some of them?   
  
The issue of conscientious objection is most commonly tied to abortion, but health 
care workers have also raised religious or moral objections to participating in 
sterilizations, euthanasia, blood transfusions, assisted suicide, reproductive 
technology, embryonic stem-cell research, and other procedures.   While some 
argue that all moral or religious objections in the health care field should be given 
the same high degree of protection, others fear this would bring the health care 
system to a screeching halt.   
 
At the same time, it is not necessarily clear that one can draw legitimate distinctions 
among various objections, at least if honoring subjective notions of conscience is 
the touchstone for decision making.  For a Jehovah’s Witness, for example, 
participating in a blood transfusion may be as disturbing as it would be for a 
Catholic to participate in an abortion. 97   
 
Some argue instead that one class of conscience claims is objectively different from 
all others—claims involving matters of life and death.  George Washington 
University Law School Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle explain the rationale 
underlying this perspective:  
 
The widespread acceptance of a right to conscientious objection rests on a 
shared recognition that abortion has a moral character that is categorically 
distinct from other practices, medical or otherwise.  Exemptions from 
mandatory provision of abortion services, like exemptions from conscription 
in times of war, focus specifically on those who might be forced to 
terminate human life.  In other words, the exemption reflects the specific 
moral character of the act, rather than a more general deference to the 
subjective demands of conscience.  Thus, proponents of exemptions have 
been much less successful in enacting broader measures that would exempt 
                                                 
95 Brookings discussion. 
96 Id. 
97 This could implicate the constitutional prohibition against governmental favoritism for one faith 
over another.  See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)(“The First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”)  
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healthcare professionals and facilities from any obligation to provide 
services they might deem objectionable.98  
 
While there is no consensus on the standard that should be applied to conscientious 
objections, there is widespread agreement that the right to refuse to participate in 
the delivery of a particular service does not include the right to attempt to block a 
patient from accessing that service.  If a pharmacist tears up a prescription for the 
morning-after pill, for example, that moves far beyond refraining from participating 
in the delivery of a service and qualifies as an impermissible effort to block access 
to that service.   “[A]lthough health professionals may have a right to object,” 
scholars Julie Cantor and Ken Baum have said, “they should not have a right to 
obstruct.”99  
 
What conditions must be present for conscientious objections to be honored? 
 
Some argue individual and institutional health care providers should always be able 
to decline to provide objectionable medical services.  This is particularly true when 
the service involved is abortion, sterilization, and assisted suicide. 100 
 
Most, however, advocate striking some kind of balance between the competing 
interests of conscience and access to health care.  The case presenting the strongest 
claim for patient access is when a patient is experiencing a medical emergency and 
another health care provider is not immediately available to serve the patient.101  In 
such a case, there is wide consensus that the physician or institution has a 
professional and ethical, if not a legal, duty to care for the patient.  
 
An Arizona Catholic-affiliated hospital came to such a conclusion when it was 
presented with a case in which a pregnant woman had pulmonary hypertension.  
Her life was in danger, and her fetus was dying, the hospital said, so it sanctioned 
an abortion.  When the presiding bishop learned about the case, however, he 
rebuked the hospital and stripped it of its Catholic affiliation.102  The performance 
                                                 
98 Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 N.W. 
J.L.& Soc.Pol’y 274 (2010).   
99 Cantor and Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Exemption at 2012. 
100 According to legal scholar Robin Fretwell Wilson, twenty states follow federal law by providing 
an absolute exemption for conscientious objectors who oppose participating in abortions and 
sterilizations. See  Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage 
from the Healthcare Context,” Same Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts 
(Rowman & Littlefield 2008): 77-102. The same is often true of statutes dealing with objections to 
participating in assisted suicide.  See e.g., Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, ORS Sec. 127.885 
Section 4.01(4) (2009)(“No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by 
statute or by any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a qualified patient of 
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”)  
101 See supra 
102 National Catholic Reporter, Phoenix bishop removes hospital’s Catholic status (December 21, 
2010) at http://ncronline.org/news/phoenix-bishop-removes-hospitals-catholic-status. 
  
Health Care Providers’ Consciences and Patients’ Needs: The Quest for Balance 
30 
of the procedure violated Catholic doctrine, he said. 103  The bishop maintained that 
“the baby was healthy and there were no problems with the pregnancy; rather, the 
mother had a disease that needed to be treated.”104 In related communications, the 
diocese said “the mother’s life cannot be preferred over the child’s,” even when the 
baby cannot survive outside the womb and the mother may die.105  Especially given 
the fact that Catholic-affiliated hospitals are the largest group of nonprofit hospitals 
in the United States and account for 17 percent of all hospital admissions annually, 
106 this case has drawn national attention. 107  
 
If a community only has effective access to one hospital or one doctor, many also 
agree that these providers must offer care to the patient.  Defenders of a broad 
understanding of conscience rights warn, however, that forcing the “last doctor” or 
“last hospital” in town to offer services to which they object may cause them to 
leave their communities.  If this happens, these communities would be deprived of 
their only sources of many different kinds of health care services.  This is a 
powerful reason, they say, to honor conscientious objections.   
 
Sociologist Tracy Weitz articulates a passionate retort to this point. “The idea that 
we would accept a lesser standard for a group of people because there is nobody 
else who is going to do it just hits my moral core,” Weitz says.  If the lone hospital, 
for example, will not offer the service, “then the state has an obligation to backfill 
                                                 
103 Catholic doctrine states: “Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their direct 
purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant woman are 
permitted when they cannot be safely postponed until the unborn child is viable, even if they will 
result in the death of the unborn child.”  See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, Fifth Edition (November 17, 2009).  
http://www.ncbcenter.org/document.doc?id=147  
104 Statement of Bishop Thomas J. Olmsted (December 21, 2010) at 
http://www.arizonacatholic.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/DIOCESE-OF-PHOENIX-
STATEMENT-122110.pdf   
105 See Diocese of Phoenix, Questions and Answers Re: The Situation at St. Joseph’s (May 18, 2010) 
at http://www.catholicsun.org/2010/phxdio-stjoes/Q-AND-A-ST-JOSEPH-HOSPITAL-FINAL.pdf 
106 Guttmacher Institute, Advocates Work to Preserve Reproductive Health Care Access When 
Hospitals Merge (April 2000) at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030203.pdf. 
107 In an effort to address aspects of this problem, some Catholic hospitals have allowed tiny, 
separately incorporated secular hospitals to operate within them and to provide services like 
sterilizations that Catholic hospitals refuse to provide.  See Rachel Benson Gold, Advocates Work to 
Preserve Reproductive Health Care Access When Hospitals Merge, The Guttmacher Report on 
Public Policy (April 2000) at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030203.pdf   Apparently, 
however, the Catholic Church has found these arrangements unacceptable in recent years, and they 
are being discontinued.  Id.; also Brookings discussion. Although physicians and nurses on the staff 
of some Catholic hospitals are willing and able to provide sterilizations, they generally are not 
permitted to do so within those institutions.  (While measures like the Church Amendments protect 
the doctor who provides abortions from being discriminated against by an institution that objects to 
them, they do not provide such a doctor with the right to perform abortions on the premises of an 
objecting institution.)  This means, for example, that patients who are served by Catholic hospitals 
and require Caesarean sections must undergo a second operation at another facility if they wish to 
have sterilization procedures following their Caesareans.   
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those services in a way that allows a sole-source hospital to survive but [does not] 
accept a lesser standard of available services.”108  
 
To avoid dilemmas like these, bioethicist Holly Fernandez Lynch has proposed that 
the focus shift from individual medical professionals to the profession as a whole 
because it is the entity that holds “a collective monopoly” over provision of medical 
services.  Institutions like state licensing boards should monitor supply and demand 
and provide incentives for willing doctors to practice in areas where refusals 
threaten patient access, Lynch says.  If professional entities perform these functions, 
Lynch argues, it can help guarantee that “monopoly power of the profession never 
(or at least rarely) trickles down to individual physicians.”109   
 
What if claims about lack of access to health care services are really complaints 
about mere inconvenience for the patient?  Referencing a lawsuit filed in 2006 over 
the right of pharmacists in the state of Washington to refuse to provide emergency 
contraception, Luke Goodrich of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty says:  
[D]espite years of factfinding during rulemaking and discovery, and despite 
a concerted canvassing effort by Planned Parenthood, it was undisputed in 
the factual record of the litigation that pro-choice groups were unable to find 
a single example of a patient in Washington who was denied the morning-
after pill for reasons of conscience and was unable to timely obtain the drug 
elsewhere. 
This result is not surprising given how widely available the morning-after 
pill is.  It is available not only at pharmacies, but also at physicians’ offices, 
government health centers, hospital emergency rooms, and via a toll-free 
hotline.  It is available at Planned Parenthood’s network of nearly one 
thousand centers across the country, many of which are in rural and 
impoverished areas.  And it is available from online drugstores with 
overnight home delivery.  The fact that a small fraction of pharmacies or 
pharmacists may decline to dispense the drug for reasons of conscience does 
not mean the drug is inaccessible.110   
Some advocates of women’s health care concede that it is relatively easy for a 
patient to access emergency contraception today, but they also argue that it is much 
more difficult to access emergency abortion care.111  Thus, protecting the rights of 
                                                 
108 Brookings discussion.   
109 Lynch, Conscientious Refusals at 165.  Lynch’s proposal addresses only individual, not 
institutional, refusals. 
110 Luke Goodrich, The Health Care and Conscience Debate, 12 Engage 121, 123 (June 2011).  
111 According to Weitz, there are only 18,000 places left in the country where abortions are provided, 
and there are 1.2 million abortions each year; see also Jones RK, Kooistra K. “Abortion incidence 
and access to services in the United States, 2008.” Perspectives on sexual and reproductive health 
(2011), 43: 41-50. 
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conscience in the former context is a different matter than protecting them in the 
latter, they say.  
 
In any case, how should we define inconvenience?  And, in true cases of patient 
inconvenience, should conscience rights always prevail?  
 
Professor Kent Greenawalt has proposed that “substantial inconvenience should be 
the test” in certain cases, something like driving more than thirty miles to another 
pharmacy.  In Greenawalt’s eyes, “consumers should not have to undergo 
substantial inconvenience to satisfy a state-created legal right of conscience.”  He 
says this standard would not necessarily be the right one for cases involving 
abortion, however.  “[I]f women are still able to get abortions, an inconvenience of 
this magnitude should not override the conviction of nurses that their participation 
assists in murder.”112   
 
Some say conscience rights should not prevail even in certain cases involving mere 
patient inconvenience.  For example, while the ACLU asserts that institutions 
should strive to accommodate their employees’ religious needs, it has argued that 
pharmacists’ objections to providing certain services should be honored only when 
the patient could receive the requested service or device in a timely manner at the 
same pharmacy.113  Apparently, this position would hold even if a patient could 
walk across the street and get her prescription filled immediately thereafter.  The 
ACLU says its position is based on the fact that “[t]he pharmacy is a state-regulated 
business that supplies medication to the general public and serves people of diverse 
backgrounds and faiths: it operates in the public world and should play by public 
rules.”114   
 
In reaching this conclusion, the ACLU argues that doing otherwise would confer a 
right to impose one’s religious views on others and that our society historically has 
not viewed separate service as an answer to discrimination.  For example, the 
ACLU points to the fact that the Civil Rights Act did not provide religious 
exemptions for restaurants and hotels when these establishments objected to 
nondiscrimination rules and nearby restaurants and hotels served clients regardless 
of race.  This principle should apply to laws and regulations governing access to 
medical services as well, the ACLU says.  Thus, the ACLU would draw a line here 
that is unrelated to access concerns.115  Others, however, reject this point of view, 
saying there are large and important differences between racial discrimination based 
                                                 
112 Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience at 22.  
113 ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights Accessing 
Birth Control at the Pharmacy (2007) at http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/religious-
refusals-and-reproductive-rights-accessing-birth-control-pharmacy. 
114 Id. at 5. 
115 ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights (2002) at 
http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/religious-refusals-and-reproductive-rights-report.  
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on religious reasons and conscientious refusal to provide certain health services to 
any patient or client. 
 
Finally, the fact that a health care provider receives some form of government aid 
matters to some when deciding whether to honor conscientious objections.116  A 
provider should not be able to tailor service offerings based on religious beliefs if 
the provider receives government funds, they say.   In other words, when 
government funds subsidize a hospital, clinic, or practice group, taxpayers 
usually ought not be denied health services there due to a provider’s religious 
objections.   To do otherwise would diminish the religious freedom of the 
patients who do not share the religious convictions of the provider.  Some 
government funds come with explicit conditions requiring the provision of 
particular health care services.  If a provider objects to these conditions, the 
provider need not accept government aid, they argue.117  
 
This was precisely the argument that was defeated with the passage of laws like 
the Church Amendment, others say.118  Government funds should not be used as 
a tool to defeat conscientious objections; instead, they should be used to protect 
such objections.  It is almost impossible for a health care provider to operate 
today without accepting some form of government funding, even if it is only 
reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid.  It is wrong and unlawful, they 
say, to place conditions on such aid that would pressure providers into forsaking 
their religious convictions.119   
 
What sort of rules should govern disclosures of conscientious objections, 
information regarding alternative providers, and referrals to other providers? 
 
The consensus view is that health care providers with religious or moral objections 
to the provision of certain services should fully disclose those objections to patients 
or prospective patients at the earliest possible moment and do so in a conspicuous 
and meaningful way.120  The form such disclosures should take, however, is a 
matter of some debate.   
                                                 
116 While some would count tax expenditures and even state licenses as government aid, others 
would limit this argument to cases involving more substantial forms of government assistance like 
grants. 
117 Some of these arguments are beginning to play out in the social service setting as well.  See 
Jerry Markon, Health, abortion issues split Obama administration and Catholic groups, The 
Washington Post (October 31, 2011). 
118 See supra  17-20. 
119 According to University of St. Thomas Law School Professor Robert K. Vischer, the danger to be 
avoided here is that, “[e]specially in fields where government funding utterly shapes the marketplace 
(education, health care), [the conditions that follow government funds could] easily render the entire 
provider landscape morally homogenous.”   Brookings discussion.  
120 Some state laws contain such disclosure requirements.  For example, California law states: “Any . 
. . facility or clinic that does not permit the performance of abortions on its premises shall post notice 
of that proscription in an area of the facility or clinic that is open to patients and prospective 
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In the case of hospitals, is placing a disclaimer on entrance forms and a prominent 
sign in the lobby sufficient? 121  What if the disclaimer relates to circumstances the 
average patient would have little, if any, expectation of encountering during his or 
her hospital stay?  Bioethicist Lori Freedman explains her concern: “Patients 
entering a Catholic-owned hospital may be aware that abortion services are not 
available there, but few prenatal patients conceive of themselves as potential 
abortion patients and therefore they are not aware of the risks involved in being 
treated there; these include delays in care and in being transported to another 
hospital during miscarriage, which may adversely affect the patient’s physical and 
psychological well-being.”122 
 
Most also agree that providers should promptly offer general information to patients 
about service alternatives.  On the other hand, requiring conscientious refusers to 
make specific referrals is deeply divisive.  ACOG’s policies require such referrals 
and argue that “[r]eferral to another provider need not be conceptualized as a 
repudiation or compromise of one’s own values, but instead can be seen as an 
acknowledgement of both the widespread and thoughtful disagreement among 
physicians and society at large and the moral sincerity of others with whom one 
disagrees.”123  The American Pharmacists Association has a similar policy and 
view.124   
 
Some strenuously disagree, however, arguing that referrals involve some 
association or cooperation with the objectionable act.  “Referring generally involves 
making the deed part of one’s own project,” theologian and bioethicist Gilbert 
Meilaender says.  Thus, Meilaender counsels, conscientious objectors should not be 
required to make such referrals.125   
 
Still others acknowledge such reservations as legitimate, but nonetheless insist 
referrals are often necessary.  For example, bioethicist Holly Fernandez Lynch says 
that, “despite valid concerns of complicity, the refusing physician likely has a 
responsibility to help patients connect with those alternate providers through direct 
referrals, or potentially through indirect referrals to some higher-level source of 
                                                                                                                                        
admittees.” Cal. Health & Safety Code Section 123420(c).   See also Neb Rev. Stat. 28-337 and Or. 
Rev. Stat. Section 435.475.  
121 Professors Julie Cantor and Ken Baum have provided specific advice on disclosures for 
pharmacies that do not stock emergency contraception. ”At the very least,” Cantor and Baum say, 
these pharmacies “should be a prominently displayed sign that says, ‘We do not provide emergency 
contraception.  Please call Planned Parenthood at 800-230-PLAN (7526) or visit the Emergency 
Contraception Web site at www.not-2-late.com for assistance.’ ” Cantor and Baum, The Limits of 
Conscientious Objection at 2011. 
122 Lori Freedman, When There’s a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned 
Hospitals, 98 American Journal of Public Health 1, 4 (October 2008).   
123 ACOG, The Limits of Conscientious Refusal at 2. 
124 Cantor and Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection at 2011. 
125 Brookings discussion. 
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information, such as state licensing board or professional association.”126  At least 
in some cases, conscientious objectors who would refuse to make direct referrals 
might not object to making indirect referrals. 
 
It is widely agreed that a right to conscientious objection does not include a right to 
proselytize, harass, or condemn patients.  Patients’ moral autonomy and dignity, 
including their own conscientious judgments, must be respected.  
 
At the same time, some argue that a health care provider should have substantial 
latitude to share the nature of his or her convictions with the patient.  The 
“[m]edical encounter is a moral encounter,” Meilaender says.127   
 
Others, however, point to concerns like the power differential inherent in the 
doctor-patient relationship and reject the notion of the medical encounter as simply 
one of many moral encounters. 128  “The health care encounter is a unique moral 
encounter,” Dr. Laurie Zoloth says, “for it involves a particular and intimate 
response to a particular human body, one with urgent needs, sufferings, fragilities, 
and failures.”  She goes on to point out that “[t]he objector, who bears none of these 
sufferings, and who controls the means to answer these needs, has a distinct duty of 
response, and owes attention to this moral duty as well.”129   Rabbi David 
Saperstein adds:  “It’s one thing to say that in the privacy of a doctor’s office the 
doctor may offer his or her moral perspective on the ethics of medical procedures.  
But it’s another to say a pharmacist could lecture a woman asking for birth control 
in front of others.” Particularly because so many of these issues involve sex and 
reproductive health, they raise real concerns about creating embarrassment for the 
patient, Saperstein warns.130  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 Greenawalt, Conscientious Refusals at 167. 
127 Brookings discussion.   
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
  
Health Care Providers’ Consciences and Patients’ Needs: The Quest for Balance 
36 
 
C O N C L U S I O N :  
S U G G E S T I O N S  F O R  P O L I C Y M A K E R S  
 
It would be neither possible nor productive to conclude this report with detailed 
recommendations on the disputed issues we have discussed.  We do have some 
broader suggestions, however, that we believe would shift the debate onto a more 
productive path. 
 
First, don’t spend much time looking for bright-line solutions.  The differences of 
principle cut too deep, and proposed solutions that completely satisfy the demands 
of any one party are bound to evoke passionate dissents from the others.  In most 
cases, the aroused losers will be able to fight rear-guard actions through Congress, 
the courts, or the regulatory process, thwarting an effective settlement.  
 
Second, accept the presumption of non-discrimination and equal treatment of 
individuals as a basis for public policy.  The default position for policymakers 
should be that the focus is on needs rather than persons and that statements of the 
form “Because of your lifestyle or sexual orientation, I refuse to provide you with a 
medical service that I would provide others” are inherently suspect.  To be sure, 
there are circumstances in which physicians may be justified in distinguishing 
between patients based on status considerations.  For example, a long history of 
alcoholism may disqualify an individual otherwise eligible to receive a liver 
transplant.  But these cases are the exception, and medical providers ought to be 
required to discharge a heavy burden of proof. 
 
Third, whenever possible, move the debate from principles to specifics.  In many 
cases, a fact-rich description of what is at stake in a particular controversy will 
make some proposed resolutions seem fairer and more reasonable than others.  For 
example, it is one thing to require nurses to participate in abortions, quite another to 
ask them to perform routine administrative duties tangentially related to the 
procedure. 
 
Fourth, distinguish between what matters and what doesn’t.  There is a reason why 
concepts such as a substantial or undue burden play an important role in law and 
regulation.  No rule is purely neutral in its impact on everyone it touches.  Some are 
advantaged, some disadvantaged.  The question is how much.  It is one thing when 
a pharmacist’s conscience makes customers seeking the morning-after pill cross the 
street, quite another when it forces them to drive hours.  In the first case, the burden 
is minimal; in the second, excessive.  Reasonable people will see the difference. 
 
Fifth, take the logic of institutions seriously.  Particular roles typically carry with 
them an ensemble of responsibilities, and it would make no sense to occupy the role 
while claiming a broad exemption from those responsibilities.  Many 
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accommodations may be possible and justified.  At some point, however, employers 
are entitled to say, “You’ll have to choose between your conscientious objections 
and your job.”  Conversely, there is a distinction between the responsibility of 
individual health professionals and of the profession as a whole.  The profession has 
an obligation to do everything it can to meet the needs of patients; not so with 
individual practitioners.  As bioethicist Holly Fernandez Lynch has noted, by 
raising mandates from the individual to the institutional level, collisions between 
the conscience of providers and the needs of patients can be minimized though not 
eliminated. 
 
Sixth, recognize that the right of conscience includes a right to decline to 
participate in the delivery of services, but it does not include a right to attempt to 
block a patient’s access to those services. There is a difference between refusals to 
participate in delivering a service and attempts to block a patient from accessing a 
service.  This line is not always bright, but most can agree not only on the principle 
but also on some applications of it.  If a pharmacist tears up a prescription for the 
morning-after pill, for example, that moves far beyond refraining from participating 
in the delivery of a service and qualifies as an effort to block access to that service.  
Health care workers may sometimes refuse to provide services, but they should not 
be permitted to create roadblocks that prevent patients from accessing those 
services. 
 
Seventh, make early and full disclosure of conscientious objections to the patient 
the rule, as well as complete and prompt disclosure of available alternative for 
service.  There is widespread agreement about the need for early and full disclosure 
regarding the conscientious objections of health care providers and available 
alternatives for service.  It is true that the issue of making referrals is fraught, but 
doctor-to-doctor referrals are not the only way to share information.  Most agree 
that conscientious objectors have a duty to notify patients about their concerns and 
that these patients should be provided with prompt and complete information about 
service alternatives.  As Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson has argued, “information-
forcing” rules may do a great deal to minimize conflicts in this area, particularly 
given the rapid development of information technologies. 131 
 
Eighth, recognize that the right to conscientious objection does not encompass a 
right to proselytize, condemn, or harass patients.  Patients’ moral autonomy and 
dignity, including their own conscientious judgments, must be respected. A right to 
object to participating in a procedure for moral or religious reasons does not justify 
proselytizing or condemnation of patients.  Just as a provider seeks respect for his 
or her conscience, the provider should honor the consciences of patients.  While 
there are differences over how much information a provider may share with a 
patient about the provider’s conscientious objection and how the provider should do 
                                                 
131 Robin Fretwell Wilson, “The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive 
Healthcare Procedures,” American Journal of Law & Medicine, 34 (2008): 61.  
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so, there is agreement that the patients’ moral autonomy and dignity should be 
respected. 
 
Ninth, acknowledge that defending the right of conscientious objection isn’t the 
same as defending the merits of the objection itself.  The culture war over abortion 
certainly affects the conscience debate, but it continues to be possible, and many 
believe, desirable, to defend another’s conscientious objection to participating in the 
delivery of a health care service while disagreeing with the objectors’ concerns 
about that service.  Americans have a long and rich history of defending each 
others’ rights of conscience even as they argue with one another about the merits of 
the underlying objections.  Recognizing a right of conscientious objection is not the 
same as saying it should prevail in all cases, but a failure to value the right of 
conscience in one context surely threatens that right in other contexts.   
 
Tenth, recognize that moral diversity in the health care profession is a public good. 
Preserving moral diversity within the health care profession helps to guard against 
the tragic ethical mistakes that often occur when dissent is silenced.132  Of course, 
all points of view on all issues of medical ethics are not equally valued.  To cite an 
extreme example, a person who believes physical abuse of children is morally 
acceptable would not be a fit health care worker.  There are many other issues, 
however, where reasonable minds may come to different moral conclusions, and it 
is helpful for the medical profession to protect the right to differ on these issues.  
Bioethicist Holly Fernandez Lynch explains: 
 
[T]he driving force and strongest argument for retaining room for moral 
refusers in the profession is the fact that many of the issues facing 
physicians raise metaphysical questions entirely immune to empirical testing 
or any other comprehensive doctrine for distinguishing right from wrong. … 
[W]e benefit from maintaining diverse viewpoints, excluding only 
arguments that are entirely illogical, for the ensuing debate will help siphon 
out the most accurate version of moral truth as errors are revealed and 
persuasive arguments are strengthened through their collision with error. 133   
 
There are differences about exactly how to value moral diversity on issues of 
medical ethics.  Most agree, however, that maintaining the freedom to differ on 
many moral issues within the medical profession is a good that should be protected.  
Many would add that this freedom is part of a larger good—that of a free and 
diverse civil society whose institutions help shape individuals and provide 
alternatives to publicly defined conceptions of the human and civic good. 
 
                                                 
132 Holly Fernandez Lynch, Conflicts of Conscience in Health Care: An Institutional Compromise at 
84-85  
133 Id. at 84-85 
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Finally, always look for ways of including competing principles and divergent 
interests.  Policymaking takes place on the level of symbolism and emotion as well 
as of calculation and impact.  Totally denying the claims of one party and 
legislating based entirely on the core arguments of the other sends a powerful 
message: your moral perceptions don’t count, and your core interests don’t matter.  
That is rarely the formula for productive and sustainable policymaking in a diverse 
democracy. 
 
Efforts to strike these balances often will meet with more approval than expected.  
While it is sometimes suggested that there are two warring sides on these matters, 
both seeking to win zero-sum games, the truth is most involved in the debate 
believe that  both protecting the rights of conscience and securing access to health 
care services are legitimate and important goals that we should seek to harmonize.  
Even when these sides  cannot agree about the circumstances in which conscience-
based claims should be honored and those in which access must take priority, they 
typically agree that both principles are worthy of respect.  And that is the common 
ground on which we have tried to build. 
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